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 *  Professor of Law and Jean Monnet Chair, Boston University School of Law. 
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International Organizations, Law and Diplomacy.
 1  Koen Lenaerts received his LLM at Harvard Law School in 1978. His LLM paper, written under 
the supervision of Duncan Kennedy in 1978, was titled  ‘ The  “ Negative Implications ” of the Commerce 
Clause and  “ Preemption ” Doctrines as Federalism-related Limitations on State Power: A Historical 
Review ’ . The paper provided an internal critique of the US jurisprudence on the dormant commerce 
clause. Sini š a Rodin received his LLM at Michigan Law School in 1992. In 2002 he visited Cornell Law 
School and his acquaintance with Mitchel Lasser infl uenced his choice of readings (most notably the 
works of Pierre Schlag). 
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 Legal Scholarship and External 
Critique in EU Law 
 DANIELA  CARUSO *  AND  FERNANDA  NICOLA **
 I. Introduction: Nostalgia and Engagement 
 Why, readers might wonder, would a group of Croatian legal scholars spearhead 
this volume ? Why would they care, at this specifi c juncture in the history of EU 
law, to refl ect on a movement — Critical Legal Studies (CLS) — born in the peculiar 
and utterly American socio-legal context of the 1970s ? 
 Two explanations come to mind. First, nostalgia. Nostalgia explains many types 
of human behaviour and may have something to do with the genesis of this vol-
ume. Contributors Judge Rodin and President Lenaerts, honourable members 
of the EU Court of Justice (CJEU), were both exposed at a younger age to CLS 
teachings in the United States. 1 They remember their encounter with critical legal 
theory, which freed them from the dogmatic cage of their coursework at home 
and allowed, for once, exploration of the law ’ s outer boundaries — its implication 
in power-building, its open-endedness, and its ambivalent relation with the quest 
for distributive justice. No one ever forgets the travels of one ’ s youth and, in the 
cleverest minds, intellectual tourism leaves the sweetest of memories. 
 To be sure, CLS ’ s critique of adjudication — with its insistence on the inextri-
cable link between judicial function and ideology, on the indeterminate nature of 
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 2  Duncan  Kennedy ,  A Critique of Adjudication :  Fin de Si è cle ( Cambridge ,  Harvard University Press , 
 1997 ) . 
 3  See Sini š a Rodin,  ‘ Useful Effect of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant ’ 
(in this volume); Koen Lenaerts,  ‘ Discovering the Law of the EU: The European Court of Justice and 
the Comparative Law Method ’ (in this volume). 
 4  See Lenaerts, ibid (positing that adopting the comparative method enables the court  ‘ to resolve 
particular gaps, confl icts and ambiguity without embarking on judicial legislation ’ ). 
 5  Croatia joined the EU in 2013. Two of the contributors to this volume are established members 
of the law faculty of the University of Zagreb: Tamara  Ć apeta and Tamara Peri š in. Judge Sini š a Rodin, 
co-editor of this volume, was a member of the same law faculty until he joined the CJEU in 2013. 
 6  Piero Calamandrei, in spite — or perhaps because of — the internal contradictions of his opus, 
famously exemplifi es the  ‘ engaged jurist ’ in the Italian legal tradition. See  Piero  Calamandrei ,  Lo Stato 
Siamo Noi ( Milan ,  Chiarelettere ,  2011 ) . 
legal arguments, and on politics in the court 2 — could make these judges deeply 
uncomfortable today. However, their contributions to this volume give that cri-
tique a nod and then quickly move on to safer ground. 3 Their superior expertise, 
classical training and explicit identifi cation of fi rm methodological boundaries 
in judicial reasoning can reassure the European reader that they have certainly 
 not caught the indeterminacy virus. 4 With due caution, nostalgia can be both 
pleasurable and harmless. Gratitude to one ’ s former teachers for their unforget-
table lessons is obviously compatible with parting ways, whether geographically 
or intellectually. 
 The other explanation for the birth of this volume is more complex, and has to 
do with a scholarly project that involves not only notable (male) jurists but also 
prominent (female) academics professionally anchored in the youngest Member 
State of the European Union. 5 In one word, we defi ne this ulterior prompt for this 
volume as  ‘ engagement ’ , legal and political. There are times in history when jurists 
become particularly aware of their responsibility in shaping the structure of gov-
ernment, in informing the discourse of and about law, and in resisting dangerous 
political trends. 6 The Croatian scholars at the helm of this project clearly perceive 
themselves to be at such a juncture, and are acting accordingly. 
 Our own contribution to this volume stems, on the one hand, from a deep 
empathy with the editors ’ project of engagement and, on the other, from 
familiarity with the CLS movement in the US. We proceed as follows:  section II 
articulates several ways in which the engaged intellectuals who spearheaded this 
volume may derive both inspiration and tools from American CLS literature. 
 Section III spotlights one particular CLS tool, known as  ‘ external critique ’ , and 
outlines its targets — namely the distributive effects of CJEU cases, their uneven 
impact on different groups, and their implications for justice across class, gender, 
race, nationality or socio-economic status.  Section IV discusses the role of pro-
gressive scholars in bringing distributive stakes to the fore and vigorously engag-
ing in the external critique of judgment in Luxembourg.  Section V illustrates two 
CLS points that complicate the work of the legal scholar — distributive ambiva-
lence and legal indeterminacy — and concludes by reasserting the value of critical 
scholarship in spite of its unavoidable limitations. 
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 7  See eg Adam  Ł azowski,  ‘ Who ’ s Got the Power ? Division of Competence in EU Membership 
Acquis ’ , paper presented at the Dubrovnik seminar,  www.pravo.unizg.hr/_download/repository/
Dubrovnik_2016_-_Programme.pdf . 
 8  Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy ,  ‘ Home ’ (2016)  www.cyelp.com/index.php/cyelp . 
 9  Christian  Joerges ,  ‘ The Europeanisation of Private Law as a Rationalisation Process and as a 
Contest of Disciplines — An Analysis of the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts ’ ( 1995 ) 
 3  European Review of Private Law  3 . 
 10  To name just one example, the Product Liability Directive proved hard to transpose in 
the  Member States, because it mobilised corporate lobbying and threatened to undo the quiet 
pro- consumer revolution conducted by judges since the 1960s.  Daniela  Caruso ,  ‘ The Missing View of 
the Cathedral ’ ( 1997 )  3  European Law Journal  3 . 
 11  Gunther  Teubner ,  ‘ Legal Irritants :  Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in 
New Differences ’ ( 1998 )  61  Modern Law Review  11 . See also  Pierre  Legrand ,  ‘ On the Singularity of Law ’ 
( 2006 )  47  Harvard International Law Journal  517, 520 (discussing, by way of example, the distributive 
impact of EU-wide sanitary standards on small enterprises and farmers in Poland who are excluded 
from the new production chains of the internal market). 
 II. EU Law Scholarship as Engagement 
 There are at least three ways in which working on EU law in a place like Zagreb is 
a form of social and political engagement. First, as a scholarly discipline, EU law is 
naturally poised to challenge established layers of authority in the law faculties of 
the new(er) Member States. This is because, by defi nition, no bulwark of academic 
power could until recently be built around this subject. In EU law, expertise is a 
prerogative of the young — a fact that allows for novel and inverted hierarchies. 
A testament to the engagement of Croatian scholars in the EU – national law debate 
is found in the Dubrovnik Jean Monnet Seminars, which have served as a regular 
forum for East – West dialogue since 2003. These seminars are known for raising 
anti-formalist issues and for introducing doctoral students to the role of policy 
and power in the creation and administration of law. 7 The proceedings of the 
Dubrovnik meetings may be published in the prestigious Croatian Yearbook of 
European Law and Policy — a peer reviewed journal of regional scope and broad 
ambition. 8 
 A second dimension of engagement appears in the operational dynamics of 
substantive EU law. Teaching and writing about EU law can be a disruptive, criti-
cal project not only in relation to the institutional layers of local academia, but 
also vis- à -vis the substance of Member States ’ law. Because the EU demands the 
approximation of domestic laws around the time of accession and at each new 
stage of integration, the process of harmonisation forces scholars, judges and 
legislators to rethink and question the rationale of national rules. 9 The resulting 
pressure for legal reform brings existing privileges and unspoken judicial poli-
cies to the surface. 10 Legal formalism is no excuse for resisting reform, and legal 
change must be fought for or resisted on the basis of clear distributive arguments. 
In other words, in the aftermath of accession, EU law often  is critique. It unveils 
false necessities in Member States ’ legal discourse and may identify winners and 
losers in consolidated domestic legal practices. 11 A loose analogy with CLS is easy 
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 12  Roberto  Unger ,  The Critical Legal Studies Movement  2nd edn ( Cambridge ,  Harvard University 
Press ,  1983 ) (emphasising the often unspoken utopian strand in CLS). 
 13  See eg  Sylvia  Wairimu Kang ’ ara ,  ‘ Beyond Bed and Bread :  Making the African State through 
 Marriage Law Reform — Constitutive and Transformative Infl uences of Anglo-American Legal 
Thought ’ ( 2012 )  9  Hastings Race  & Poverty Law Journal  353 . 
 14  The Croatian Yearbook self-identifi es as a critical project and explicitly aims to embed legal 
 questions  ‘ in a wider political, economic and social context ’ ,  Yearbook (n 8). 
 15  See  Joseph  HH Weiler ,  ‘ Van Gend en Loos :  The Individual as Subject and Object and the Dilemma 
of European Legitimacy ’ ( 2014 )  12  International Journal of Constitutional Law  94 ;  Daniela  Caruso , 
 ‘ Limits of the Classic Method :  Positive Action in the European Union after the New Equality Directives ’ 
( 2003 )  44  Harvard International Law Journal  331 . 
 16  Damjan  Kukovec ,  ‘ Law and the Periphery ’ ( 2015 )  21  European Law Journal  406 ;  Marija  Bartl , 
 ‘ The Way We Do Europe :  Subsidiarity and the Substantive Democratic Defi cit ’ ( 2015 )  21  European 
Law Journal  23 ;  Fernanda  Nicola ,  ‘ Invisible Cities in Europe ’ ( 2012 )  35  Fordham International Law 
Journal  1282 . 
 17  Marija  Bartl ,  ‘ Internal Market Rationality, Private Law and the Direction of the Union :  Resusci-
tating the Market as the Object of the Political ’ ( 2015 )  21  European Law Journal  572 . 
 18  See, eg,  Daniela  Caruso and  Joanna  Geneve ,  ‘ Trade and History :  The Case of EU-Algeria  Relations ’ 
( 2015 )  33 ( 1 )  Boston University International Law Journal . 
 19  Iris  Goldner Lang ,  ‘ Is There Solidarity on Asylum and Migration in the EU ? ’ ( 2013 )  9  Croatian 
Yearbook of European Law and Policy  1 . 
to establish here. Two defi ning features of the CLS movement are the denuncia-
tion of false necessity in legal deduction and the focus on the distributive and 
redistributive consequences of legal rules. These very features happen also to be 
natural by-products of early-stage Europeanisation. CLS was a militant project 
in the American legal academy of the 1970s and continues to display defi ant and 
 utopian features 12 in the many corners of the world where it has seeped under 
various guises. 13 It is therefore an inspiration for those scholars who, like the edi-
tors of this volume, perceive their engagement with EU law as part of a larger 
project of justice. 14 
 Third, and most importantly, this volume refl ects a desire to subject EU law 
itself to a critical rethinking. It is clear by now that the Europeanisation of law 
has brought about its own set of questionable dogmas: the centrality of the 
 individual, 15 a structural blindness to intra-EU distribution, 16 a strong market 
paradigm that often crowds out alternate visions, 17 and a practical indifference 
to the geopolitical externalities of the project. 18 From the standpoint of Croatian 
scholars in particular, the EU ’ s own role in such post-accession catastrophes as 
the Euro-zone crisis and the deaths of thousands of migrants in the Mediterra-
nean waters requires closer scrutiny at the very least. 19 When the dust of acces-
sion settles and the promises of peace and prosperity fail to materialise, scholarly 
engagement necessarily takes a sceptical turn and begins to contemplate whether 
foundational concepts of EU law might themselves be vehicles of distributive and 
ideological regression. Here, EU law is not the critique. EU law is its object. 
 The propensity to engage in a sustained critique of EU law marbles several 
 contributions in this volume and certainly animates this chapter. This generally 
critical stance takes the present stage of legal Europeanisation as a fact and aims 
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 20  Umberto  Eco ,  Misreadings ( San Diego ,  Harcourt Brace ,  1993 ) . 
 21  See, eg,  M á ximo  Langer ,  ‘ From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations :  The Globalization of Plea 
Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure ’ ( 2004 )  45  Harvard International 
Law Journal  1 . 
 22  See  Diego  L ó pez Medina ,  ‘ Por Qu é Hablar de Una  “ Teor í a Impura del Derecho ” Para Am é rica 
Latina ? ’ in  Daniel  Bonilla Maldonado (ed),  Teor í a del Derecho y Trasplantes Jur í dicos ( Bogot á ,  Siglo del 
Hombre ,  2009 ) (explaining why misreadings need not be corrected). 
 23  Gr á inne  De B ú rca ,  ‘ The Road Not Taken :  The EU as a Global Human Rights Actor ’ ( 2011 )  105 
 American Journal of International Law  649 . 
 24  See  Duncan  Kennedy ,  ‘ The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies ’ in  Wendy  Brown and  Janet 
 Halley (eds),  Left Legalism/Left Critique ( Durham NC ,  Duke University Press ,  2002 ) . 
 25  Joseph  Weiler ,  ‘ Editorial :  Individuals and Rights — The Sour Grapes ’ ( 2010 )  21 ( 2 )  European Jour-
nal of International Law  277 . 
 26  Damjan  Kukovec ,  ‘ Economic Law, Inequality and Hidden Hierarchies on the EU Internal Market ’ 
( 2017 )  38 ( 1 )  Michigan Journal of International Law . 
 27  Dimitry  Kochenov ,  Gr á inne  de B ú rca and  Andrew  Williams (eds),  Europe ’ s Justice Defi cit ? 
( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing ,  2015 ) . 
 28  Rodolfo  Sacco ,  ‘ Legal Formants :  A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law ’ ( 1991 )  39  American 
Journal of Comparative Law  1 . 
 29  Bryant  Garth ,  ‘ The Florence Access-to-Justice Project in Law and in Context :  Mauro Cappelletti 
as Importer, Exporter, and Academic Entrepreneur ’ ( 2016 )  Annuario di Diritto Comparato  13 . 
to make full use of the possibilities for political and social justice it can currently 
 support, but at the same time it decries its many structural and dynamic draw-
backs. In doing so, this critical project borrows liberally from CLS without fear 
of misreading or misappropriation. Irreverence in this context is a feature, not 
a bug. 20 The CLS toolkit is clearly useful to European scholars, but there is no 
pretence here of fi delity to the original CLS conception. 21 Transformations can 
be productive on EU soil, and there is no reason not to utilise, albeit in a different 
epistemic environment, the motivational force of lessons drawn from far-away 
places or times. 22 
 The CLS toolkit can be embraced selectively; its tenets disassembled and 
recomposed at leisure. For instance, the methodology of internal critique works 
best when EU legal deduction is simply fl awed or when interpretive results pre-
sented as necessary are no more plausible than the road not taken. 23 External 
critique is useful when decisions made at any node of the EU system lead to dis-
tributively questionable outcomes. The critique of rights — another staple of CLS 
 scholarship 24 — easily takes apart such constructs as EU citizenship 25 and market 
access, 26 which may lead to a defi cit of substantive justice. 27 
 What CLS stands for, when translated onto the operational level of EU legal 
scholarship, is a thorough rethinking of the project of integration through law in 
any of its formants, 28 not just the judicial one. 29 With no pledge of adherence to 
the CLS archetype and no obvious political direction, this loosely  critical  posture 
may come across to CLS founders as inchoate and even spineless — in other words, 
as a non-movement. In the current landscape of EU legal scholarship, critique 
is indeed piecemeal and disaggregated. If it is a project at all, it is one of scat-
tered resistance with no fl ag or army. Yet, as the following sections illustrate, 
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 30  The distinction between internal and external perspectives in law predates the CLS movement. 
See  Brian  Z Tamanaha ,  ‘ The Internal/External Distinction and the Notion of a  “ Practice ” in Legal 
Theory and Sociolegal Studies ’ ( 1996 )  30  Law and Society Review  163 ;  Charles  L Barzun ,  ‘ Inside-Out : 
 Beyond the Internal/External Distinction in Legal Scholarship ’ ( 2015 )  101  Virginia Law Review  1203 . 
 31  Marc  Galanter ,  ‘ Why the  “ Haves ” Come Out Ahead :  Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change ’ 
( 1974 )  9  Law and Society Review  95 ;  Duncan  Kennedy ,  Legal Reasoning :  Collected Essays ( Aurora CO , 
 Davies Group Publishers ,  2008 ) . 
 32  See  Sini š a  Rodin ,  ‘ A Metacritique of the Court of Justice of the EU ’ ( 2016 )  4  Il Diritto dell ’ Unione 
Europea  193 . 
 33  This belief is fi rmly held or at least clearly deployed also in progressive circles. See eg  Michelle 
 Everson ,  ‘ An Exercise in Legal Honesty :  Rewriting the Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsger-
icht ’ ( 2015 )  21  European Law Journal  21 . 
 34  Below  s III (discussing distributive principles in the  E Fritz case). 
 35  Below  ss IV and V . 
 36  The points summarily articulated in this section are further explored in  Daniela  Caruso ,  ‘ Fairness 
at a Time of Perplexity :  The Civil Law Principle of Fairness in the Court of Justice of the European 
Union ’ in  Stefan  Vogenauer and  Stephen  Weatherill (eds),  General Principles of Law :  European and 
Comparative Perspectives ( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing ,  2017 )  329 . 
EU law can be better analysed, understood and perhaps transformed when 
observed through CLS-tinted glasses. 
 We prioritise here external critique over the many other tools in the CLS kit. 
By external critique, we mean the scholarly activity of highlighting the distribu-
tive stakes — and therefore the political and ideological dimensions — of legal 
disputes adjudicated by the CJEU. 30 The importance of external critique lies 
in the fact that adjudication plays a role in eliminating or maintaining privi-
lege, or class and race inequalities. 31 In comparison to the tool of internal cri-
tique, which focuses on logical inconsistencies in judicial reasoning and reveals 
the often ambivalent results of deduction, external critique is a harder sell in 
Europe, 32 given the still widespread belief in the importance of isolating the 
judicial function from concern with the political impact of each case ’ s outcome. 33 
We nonetheless hope to show fi rst, that distributive arguments are  as a matter of 
fact not foreign to judicial reasoning in Luxembourg 34 and, second, that scholarly 
commentary on the correctness of such arguments, whether expressed or silently 
woven into the fabric of judgments, is a necessary and important part of the life 
of engaged jurists. 35 
 III. Distributive Arguments in Adjudicatory Practice 
 Whether judges in Luxembourg, or elsewhere, should take into account the larger 
distributive consequences of their decisions remains an  unsettled question. 36 
Prominent scholars object to distributive justice as a goal of adjudication because 
of the conviction that (re)distribution is more effi ciently achieved through taxation 
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 37  Louis  Kaplow and  Steven  Shavell ,  ‘ Why the Legal System is Less Effi cient than the Income Tax in 
Redistributing Income ’ ( 1994 )  23  Journal of Legal Studies  667 . 
 38  Lee  Anne Fennell and  Richard  McAdams ,  ‘ The Distributive Defi cit in Law and Economics ’ ( 2016 ) 
 100  Minnesota Law Review  1051 (providing a thorough critique of the assumption that taxation is 
always a preferable strategy for wealth redistribution). 
 39  See  Robert  Hale ,  ‘ Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State ’ ( 1923 )  Political 
Science Quarterly  470 . 
 40  See  Fernanda  Nicola ,  ‘ Transatlanticisms :  Constitutional Asymmetry and Selective Reception of 
US Law and Economics in the Formation of European Private Law ’ ( 2008 )  16  Cardozo Journal of Inter-
national and Comparative Law  101 (arguing in favour of an open analysis of distributive consequences 
in the CJEU ’ s private law judgments). 
 41  It is often the case that with judicial balancing, by now a feature of adjudication around the 
globe, mere lip service is paid to confl icting considerations, but no real solace can be found against 
regressive outcomes of law and policy choices.  Duncan  Kennedy ,  ‘ Three Globalizations of Law and 
Legal Thought ’ in  David  Trubek and  Alvaro  Santos (eds),  The New Law and Development :  A Criti-
cal Appraisal ( Cambridge ,  Cambridge University Press ,  2006 ) . See also  Mitchel  Lasser ,  ‘ Fundamen-
tally Flawed :  The CJEU ’ s Jurisprudence on Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ’ ( 2014 ) 
 15  Theoretical Inquiries in Law  229 . 
 42  Kennedy (n 2). 
 43  For the argument that, as a matter of positive law, redistributive motives are already pervasive in 
all corners of adjudication, including private law, see  Duncan  Kennedy ,  ‘ Distributive and Paternalist 
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargain-
ing Power ’ ( 1982 )  Maryland Law Review  563 . See also  Aditi  Bagchi ,  ‘ Distributive Justice and Contract ’ 
in  Gregory  Klass ,  George  Letsas and  Prince  Saprai (eds),  Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law 
( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2013 ) . 
 44  Penn Cent Transp Co v City of New York , 438 US 104 ( 1978 ) . 
and other forms of transfers, as opposed to judgment in discrete disputes. 37 But in 
equally reputable milieus, courts are expected to redress, within the  boundaries of 
judicial discretion, the predicaments of situationally disadvantaged parties. 38 This 
is because — among other reasons — a distribution-insensitive mode of adjudica-
tion would not be  neutral , but rather bound to produce  regressive results that defy 
common notions of justice. 39 
 In European circles, there is a pervasive assumption that distributive arguments 
do not belong in judicial reasoning. 40 Most courts, aiming to preserve legitimacy 
and authority, generally cling to the language of internal coherence; to this goal, 
they stay within the boundaries of doctrinal abstraction and formalism, or at most 
put forth an even-handed balancing of distributively neutral policies (effi ciency, 
judicial economy, protection of expectations, etc). 41 CLS notoriously challenges 
this judicial posture on both normative 42 and descriptive grounds. 43 
 In an American CLS perspective, a paradigmatic example of judicial responsive-
ness to distributive considerations is found in Justice Brennan ’ s opinion in  Penn 
Central v New York . 44 The facts are well known and are only summarily recalled 
here. Appellants, owners of Penn Central Station, had sought a permit to build 
above the existing station ’ s structure, but because of a zoning regulation aimed 
at preserving historic landmarks, their request was denied. The appellants then 
sought monetary compensation. In their view, the denial of the permit resulted 
in the taking of their  jus aedifi candi and in a signifi cant depreciation of real estate 
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 45  ibid 147. 
 46  It is often in the AG ’ s opinion that one fi nds a more explicit engagement with the distributive 
consequences of the Court ’ s choices. Take for instance the opinion of Advocate General Eleanor 
Sharpston, aimed at striking down a reverse discriminatory scheme in Belgium.  Case C-212/06  Govt 
of the French Cmty v Flemish Govt [ 2008 ]  ECR I-1683 . Here, Sharpston openly explains that an uneven 
allocation of resources might be simply discriminatory, and therefore illegal, or it might be aimed 
to promote growth in underdeveloped territories. In either case, Sharpston makes the point that 
European judges are well situated to understand the progressive or regressive impact of a domestic 
regulatory scheme on different local and transnational communities. See ibid para 155. For reasons 
investigated in depth especially by  Mitchel  Lasser ,  Judicial Deliberations ( Oxford ,  Oxford University 
Press ,  2009 ) , this position is seldom taken by the Court so openly. 
 47  Case C-215/08  E Friz GmbH v Carsten von der Heyden [ 2010 ]  ECR I-2947 . The facts and the 
law of the  E Friz case have been thoroughly analysed by other scholars, making a full summary here 
redundant. See  Martijn  Hesselink ,  ‘ The General Principles of Civil Law :  Their Nature, Roles and Legiti-
macy ’ in  Dorota  Leczykiewicz and  Stephen  Weatherill (eds),  The Involvement of EU Law in Private Law 
 Relationships ( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing ,  2013 )  131 . 
 48  Dir 85/577/EEC. 
 49  Case C-481/99  Heininger v Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG [ 2001 ]  ECR I-09945 ; 
Case-412/06  Annelore Hamilton v Volksbank Filder eG [ 2008 ]  ECR I-02383 (discussing the issue of 
limitation on the time for repentance). 
value. Famously, Brennan saw things otherwise. In his view, the appellants should 
only be thankful for the City ’ s time-honoured practice of preserving  historic 
landmarks from disorderly urban development. In fact, strict zoning in the area 
around the station was precisely the reason for the enormous value of Penn 
Central ’ s property. In the balancing of property rights against public interest, it 
therefore became clear that the appellants derived great advantage from the very 
regulatory practice they now deemed harmful and deserved, as a consequence, no 
compensation. 45 
 The mode of judicial reasoning adopted in  Penn Central may strike some Euro-
pean observers as excessively open-ended, but it is hard to see how the dispute 
could be seriously resolved without resorting to Brennan ’ s distributive logic. The 
case shows that a lucid consideration of benefi ts and harms is not beyond the 
realm of judicial functions, but is rather essential to an intelligent adjudication of 
specifi c cases. Is this type of reasoning off limits in Luxembourg ? Interestingly, it 
is not. 46 
 Take, for instance,  E Friz , a ground-breaking case decided at the dawn of this 
decade by the CJEU. 47 In brief, in 1991 Mr von der Heyden received an unsolicited 
visit by a tax consultant who convinced him to invest, together with other partners, 
in the modernisation of decrepit real estate in Berlin. For contracts concluded 
in this haphazard fashion, the EU door-step selling directive grants consumers a 
right to repent, ie to cancel the deal in a period of no less than seven days from due 
notice of this right. 48 If the consumer receives no such notice — as was the case in 
 E Friz — the possibility to cancel lasts much longer. 49 Accordingly, Mr von der 
 Heyden withdrew from the partnership in 2002, after a period of over 10 years, 
hoping to recoup the full value of his investment on restitutionary grounds. The 
partnership, however, refused to refund Mr von der Heyden in full and asked 
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 50  E Friz (n 47). 
 51  ibid. 
 52  AG Trstenjak pointed out that  ‘ Investment in [junk] property, which Germans opted for primar-
ily on account of the resultant tax benefi ts, has often failed to deliver the expected results, and investors 
have therefore looked for ways of terminating those investments by relying inter alia on the Commu-
nity directives concerning consumer protection ’ .  E Friz (n 47) para 3. 
 53  See  Ugo  Mattei and  Fernanda  Nicola ,  ‘ A  “ Social Dimension ” in European Private Law ? :  The Call 
for Setting a Progressive Agenda ’ ( 2006 )  41  New England Law Review  1 . 
 54  Duncan Kennedy,  ‘ Proportionality and ‘Deference’ in Contemporary Constitutional Thought ’ 
(in this volume). 
 55  For a nuanced and profound discussion of this point in this volume, see Tamara  Ć apeta,  ‘ Ideology 
and Legal Reasoning at the European Court of Justice ’ , s V,  ‘ Conclusions ’ , in this volume. cf Kennedy, 
 ‘ Role of Courts ’ (n 54); and Lenaerts (n 3) (espousing radically different visions of the role of ideology 
in the subjective experience of judging). 
instead that he pay his share of the steep losses suffered over the years. This result 
would comply with German law and in particular with the judicial principle of 
 ‘ defective partnership ’ , duly highlighted for the CJEU by AG Trstenjak in her 
opinion. 50 
 The language used by the Court to endorse the latter result was unmistakably 
sensitive to distributive concerns. 51 In 2010, two full years into the fi nancial cri-
sis, consumers all over Europe and beyond shared Mr von der Heyden ’ s desire to 
walk back from improvident investments. 52 The  E Friz judges were surrounded 
by news of pervasive fi nancial disasters, and were constantly reminded that the 
consequences of poor fi nancial market regulation would hit some pockets of the 
EU population much more heavily than others. Apportioning losses fairly, ie pro-
tecting those who were hopelessly stuck with the partnership from the sudden 
fl ight of those who could withdraw their membership, seemed to be what jus-
tice required. Interestingly, the Court went beyond mere judicial necessity, and 
openly appealed to solidarity between those who could fl ee and those left behind 
in the quagmire of fi nancial disaster. It is at least plausible that the judges could 
see the analogy between the uneven distribution of losses inside the  E Friz part-
nership on one hand, and Europe ’ s larger inequities on the other: the widening 
of the spreads, the plight of the unemployed and the predicament of the PIIGS 
(Portugal,  Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain), at that time haunted by serious debt 
restructuring problems. In the midst of sobering refl ections on law ’ s complicity in 
perpetuating Europe ’ s inequalities, it may be important to take stock of narrow, 
but clear, progress through law. 53 
 E Friz confi rms that in Luxembourg, whenever an interpretive gap leaves the 
judge room to manoeuvre, a lucid assessment of circumstances and distributive 
considerations  may precede and guide the decision-making process. The case 
says nothing, however, on the normative  desirability of such arguments inside 
the court — a point dear to CLS founders. 54 Some contributions in this volume 
directly tackle the argument that judges should engage systematically and openly 
in distribution-sensitive argumentation. 55 We take no stance on such a point in 
these pages. History is replete with situations in which mere judicial adherence to 
formalism or to distribution-opaque legal arguments produces results which are 
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highly desirable from the perspective of substantive justice. It is not our purpose to 
challenge this type of judicial work on ethical grounds — at least not here. 
 Our argument here is rather aimed at informing European legal scholarship 
only ( la doctrine ), in the hope that a feedback loop between judicial and academic 
milieus may ultimately lead to substantively progressive outcomes in Luxembourg 
as well as in the EU ’ s legislative and administrative fora. 
 IV. External Critique: The Role 
of European Scholars
 As noted by Pierre Schlag, judges are often excessively narrow in their defi nition 
of a dispute ’ s context. 56 Academic scholarship, on the other hand, is not bound by 
the built-in constraints of judicial activity nor by the time pressure under which 
European judges are compelled to decide. Scholars have the necessary institu-
tional freedom and research capabilities to weave together the different narratives 
surrounding each case, to identify the perspectives of possible winners and los-
ers, and to focus on the broader distributive consequences of a judgment in 
Luxembourg. 57 
 An external critique of EU adjudication is essential to ensure that judicial 
decision-making and its often obscure distributive consequences are known and 
understood, not only in lawyers ’ circles but also in civil society, where choices 
of broader political salience should be made. 58 This type of scholarly activity 
is continually needed not only to decipher the reasoning behind technical judi-
cial language, 59 but also to make explicit the law-making by-products of judicial 
dispute resolution. 60 In addition, European scholarship is an important site of 
transnational legal theory — a fi eld now undergoing intense critical scrutiny and 
major transformations, including greater historical self-awareness and global 
reach. 61 
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 The external critique of adjudication does not fi gure predominantly in the cor-
pus of EU law scholarship. 62 Its relative scarcity may be due to a habit of respect 
for judicial function, or to the widespread belief that legislation, rather than 
 adjudication, is the proper forum for redressing material inequities. 63 It is also 
the case that external critique of judicial reasoning is less in tune with the civil 
law tradition, in which judges are not perceived as  ‘ culture heroes [or] parental 
fi gures ’ , but rather as civil servants, ie riders  ‘ of a machine built and operated by 
legislators ’ . 64 The paucity of scholarly critique grounded in distributive concerns 
prevents the emergence of a robust, sustained exchange between scholars and the 
bench that is common in other judicial cultures. 65 The landscape is changing, 
however, and the Court has experienced deep transformations over its 60 years 
of  existence. 66 The fact that the Court is now staffed by a transnational legal elite 
and its  bureaucracy 67 — immersed in comparative methodologies and moulded 
by a plurality of legal infl uences 68 — should facilitate a more fruitful conversation 
between scholars and the judicial branch. 69 
 To be sure, powerful critiques have been deployed against the Court of Justice 
on grounds other than distribution. 70 Scholars have often demanded increased 
argumentation and express weighing of competing policies. 71 They have also 
engaged in internal critiques aimed at denouncing the Court ’ s formalism, 
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identifying its incoherent use of legal ontologies, and deconstructing its reasoning 
from within. 72 Yet, no matter how thoroughly argued and internally coherent, a 
judicial opinion may produce regressive distributive effects that need to be clari-
fi ed in order to be redressed in a timely manner. By the same token, a judicial opin-
ion may have inconspicuous progressive outcomes, which may remain sporadic 
in application if not suffi ciently highlighted in commentary and then generalised 
through law and policy. It is the task of scholars across a range of social sciences to 
engage in this type of analysis. 
 In our view, legal scholarship should embrace the task of external critique 
through three different moves. The fi rst consists in emphasising the distributive 
stakes of each judgment (a). 73 The second is to take a position in support of the 
marginalised groups that may be saddled with the regressive distributive conse-
quences of a judicial decision (b). A third move engages with deeper political and 
economic choices, and aims to achieve a more egalitarian, democratic and utopian 
society (c). 
 A. Foregrounding the Distributive Stakes 
 Through the lens of positive sociology functionalism, 74 scholars can highlight 
which groups or constituencies are impacted by the new allocation of rights and 
privileges that result from each judgment. This can be done through interdisci-
plinary, empirical or archival work. Jurists may have to borrow from other social 
sciences or engage directly in detective work in order to gain a broader sense of 
the consequences of judicial decisions, which extend beyond the perspective of the 
parties of any given case. 75 A lesson dear to the CLS movement, 76 but grounded 
in the earlier tradition of legal realism, 77 is that distributive effects are intrinsic 
 233Legal Scholarship and External Critique
 78  David Kennedy, ibid 204. 
 79  See  Sir  Stephen Wall ,  ‘ Leaving the EU ? ’ ( 2016 )  22  European Public Law  57 . See also  Steve  Peers , 
 ‘ The Final UK/EU Renegotiation Deal :  Legal Status and Legal Effect ’ ( 2016 )  EU Law Analysis  http://
eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2016/02/the-fi nal-ukeu-renegotiation-deal-legal.html . 
 80  Case C-209/03  Bidar v London Borough of Ealing [ 2005 ]  ECR I-2119 . 
 81  Michael  Dougan ,  ‘ Fees, Grants, Loans and Dole Cheques :  Who Covers the Cost of Migrant 
Education within the EU ? ’ ( 2005 )  42  Common Market Law Review  943, 972 ;  Gareth  Davies ,  ‘ “ Any Place 
I Hang My Hat ? ” or :  Residence is the New Nationality ’ ( 2005 )  11  European Law Journal  43 . 
 82  See  Catherine  Barnard ,  ‘ Of Students and Babies ’ ( 2005 )  64  Cambridge Law Journal  560, 563 . 
See also  Catherine  Barnard ,  ‘ Note on  Bidar ’ ( 2005 )  42  Common Market Law Review  1465 . 
 83  See Gisella Gori,  ‘ Mademoiselle Gravier and Equal Access to Education: Success and Boundaries 
of European Integration ’ in Davies and Nicola (n 57) 446 (at least in the UK). 
to legal rules and that  ‘ [l]aw is present whenever gains are distributed, facilitating 
their aggregation or ensuring their dispersion ’ . 78 
 Take the liberalisation of education in the EU for instance — a timely topic in 
light of the potentially steep costs of Brexit. 79 Since the 1990s, England experienced 
a signifi cant infl ux of EU students entitled by EU law to UK national treatment 
with respect to both tuition fees and maintenance grants. It was in this context 
that the CJEU, with its decision in  Bidar , 80 precipitated a political backlash. Denis 
Bidar, a French national, entered the UK to complete his secondary education and 
never had recourse to social assistance. In 2001, when he began to study econom-
ics at University College London, he received assistance for his tuition fees, but his 
application for fi nancial aid to cover his housing costs in London was refused on 
the ground that he was not suffi ciently settled in the UK. Seized with a preliminary 
question, in 2005 the CJEU held that, given Mr Bidar ’ s  ‘ genuine link ’ with the UK, 
he could not be treated as a  ‘ grant-tourist ’ and as such discriminated against. He 
would therefore be able to receive the housing subsidy. The court was well aware 
of the consequences this decision would have for the UK education system. Not 
surprisingly, in the aftermath of  Bidar , the UK ramped up its residency require-
ments to three years for assistance seekers in similar situations. 81 Some scholars 
applauded  Bidar as a progressive decision, enabling internal free movement and 
affi rming the principle of nondiscrimination, and praised the Court for putting 
a premium on  ‘ residence, integration and solidarity: the longer the migrants are 
resident in the host State, the more integrated they are in the society of the host 
State in terms of benefi ts ’ . 82 Others, however, condemned the regressive distribu-
tive consequences of this judgment in particular, and of the EU education saga in 
general. For instance, Gisella Gori noted that certain states, namely the UK and 
Belgium, were  ‘ net importers of students ’ in the context of European education 
mobility. According to Gori this was, in such states, a matter of public fi nance: 
broadening the class of housing assistance recipients would shift the funding of 
education from the private sector (via loans) to tax payers ’ contributions (via 
grants). 83 
 The policy implications of  Bidar appear equally regressive if examined 
through the lens of local government. Bidar ’ s housing subsidy, allocated to 
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 students residing in the Ealing Borough, had a precise redistributive aim.  Ealing 
is located in West London and is populated in large part by non-affl uent and 
immigrant  people. 84 The resident subsidy for students in that particular borough 
was probably aimed at helping certain vulnerable groups such as the children 
of Polish, Caribbean and African immigrants rather than foreigners. But in the 
aftermath of  Bidar , housing allowances to residents going to London universi-
ties became substantially lower with likely negative consequences for the intended 
benefi ciaries of the subsidy. 
 B. Taking a Stance 
 The second step in our external critique should enable scholars to explore the 
politics of judicial decision-making. Jurists know well that the doctrinal and 
social effects of each case are deeply intertwined. Even though law remains rela-
tively autonomous, scholars can show how a particular interpretation of standing 
requirements, 85 free movement rights, or of a liability regime can have politically 
salient implications and favour certain groups at the expense of others. Take for 
instance  Gonzalez Sanchez , 86 a hotly contested and arguably conservative decision 
of the ECJ: in this judgment the Court, through an activist interpretation of rel-
evant rules, denied consumers who had contracted Hepatitis C through blood 
transfusions the possibility of suing their healthcare providers, and thus let them 
bear their own costs. Compare this case with  Oc é ano Grupo , 87 a decision widely 
acclaimed by pro-consumer advocates. Here, two Spanish sellers sued fi ve buyers 
for unpaid sums, due under a contract of adhesion, for the sale of encyclopaedias. 
The ECJ famously allowed a Spanish court to declare the term void of its own 
motion, setting aside the sellers ’ argument that this procedural matter should be 
determined by internal law only. It is important to note, in this regard, that while 
in cases like  Gonzalez Sanchez or  Oc é ano Grupo the progressive or regressive dis-
tributive consequences of the Court ’ s holding are obvious, in others they remain 
rather indeterminate and that, given the nature of EU law, the Court ’ s adjudica-
tion on legal questions may not have a clear distributive impact. 88 In such cases it 
is all the more imperative that scholars point out the distributive ambivalence of 
the Court ’ s pronouncements. 89 
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 C. Pointing at Progress 
 A third move in our external critique refl ects the more utopian side of CLS, which 
requires pondering what to do post-critique in order to achieve a more equitable 
and democratic society. Here, scholars may promote ideological progress through 
legal doctrines, legal education, or judicial and lawyering techniques. 90 A more 
radical avenue is to show how legal reforms, no matter how well meaning, run out 
of steam if they are grafted onto larger systemic inequalities, 91 which can only be 
addressed through a reconceptualisation of basic legal entitlements, 92 transforma-
tive institutions, 93 or ideological changes. 94 
 This utopian vein characterises Hans-W Mickliz ’ s refl ections on the outcome 
of  Aziz . 95 This case, decided by a fi rst chamber led by Vice-President Tizzano in 
the role of reporting judge, is one of the most acclaimed decisions rendered in 
the aftermath of the fi nancial crisis. The answer of the CJEU amounted to what 
scholars called an  ‘ earthquake ’ . 96 The Court held that the Spanish procedural rules 
impaired the level of protection required by the Unfair Terms Directive 97 and pro-
vided, in line with the opinion of AG Kokott, concrete guidance on how to apply 
the tests of  ‘ signifi cant imbalance ’ and  ‘ good faith ’ . 98 The outcome of  Aziz led to 
several important reforms of Spanish mortgage enforcement procedures. 99 Most 
signifi cantly it showed desperate consumers, on the verge of losing their homes 
and deeply resentful of EU-led austerity policies, that the Court does not ignore 
humanity. 100 
 On the other hand, Micklitz has noted that defi ning standards of fairness is 
a much larger issue in an austerity-ridden Europe than the  Aziz court was will-
ing to concede. It is an issue that encompasses much more than the private law 
 acquis , and calls for broader refl ections on the meaning of social rights in the 
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EU  Charter. 101 It is also problematic to let the Court be the sole social engineer in 
matters that require a much more robust and open democratic dialogue. While 
 praising the court for  ‘ getting it right ’ in the particular context of  Aziz , and for ena-
bling pro-debtor litigation strategies across the EU, Micklitz reminded readers that 
the problem of mortgage insolvency could be much better handled via a mix of 
judicial, legislative and administrative solutions. 102 This is the sort of big- picture 
utopia that the CLS movement recommends, and that we hope to  encounter more 
frequently in the academic commentary of CJEU decisions. 
 V. Scholarship and the Challenge of Indeterminacy 
 Foregrounding the distributive stakes of EU law disputes is clearly important 
when the judgment is cast in formalist terms, with unproblematic reference to 
the internal logic of the EU legal system. But identifying distributive issues is just 
as relevant when the court does engage in a balancing of confl icting rights or 
interests — a seemingly anti-formalist move — and yet portrays the stakes of the 
case as politically neutral, and eventually frames its result in the language of legal 
 necessity. 103 This was the decision-making move adopted by the CJEU in such 
cases as  Laval (C-341/05) and  Viking (C-438/05), both obviously linked to radi-
cal tensions between organised Nordic labour, employers and lower-wage workers 
coming from newly acceded Member States. 104 In the aftermath of such judg-
ments, a variety of commentators hurried to add texture to the court ’ s analysis 
and to explain how, following the judgments, a particular vision of societal welfare 
had been asserted or reinforced. 105 
 Competing accounts emerged. Some saw these cases as a regrettable triumph 
of shallow cosmopolitanism, as an undue challenge to hard-fought labour-
capital equilibria, and as a worrisome dismantlement of national inter-class sol-
idarity. 106 Others looked at these disputes from the perspective of Central and 
Eastern Europe ’ s job seekers and reached very different conclusions. This view 
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emphasised that low-wage migrant workers were seeking not just free movement 
(an economic right), but also  social rights (the right to work, the right to decent 
conditions), which were just as important as the social rights of the allegedly dis-
placed Nordic workers. 107 Still others followed the on-the-ground repercussions 
of such cases, tracing the ensuing arrangements between social partners in the 
affected states and economic sectors. 108 
 The scholarly debate did not directly steer the court in one direction or another, 
but it made the crucial point that it was not possible for the Union to move for-
ward without a thorough rethinking of labour-capital relations and without pon-
dering, legally and politically, the distributive consequences of enhanced labour 
and capital mobility. The debate made clear, in other words, that the terse language 
of the EC Treaty on matters of free movement would not simply produce market 
effi ciencies (if any), but would more likely trigger competition for fi nite resources 
and require a new political and philosophical arrangement. It also made clear 
that social and economic rights, as spelled out in primary and secondary EU law, 
would be simply the beginning of politically diffi cult conversations — not closing 
lines of cogent legal syllogisms. 
 Similarly situated at the crossroads of confl icting value choices is a more recent 
decision,  Alo and Osso . 109 The case revolved around the possibility for Syrian citi-
zens, found worthy of subsidiary protection in Germany (though not yet eligible 
for refugee status), to pick and choose where exactly to settle in their host state. 
Here again, the Court found itself in the midst of confl icting considerations. On 
the one hand, the fact that both EU citizens and some categories of third-country 
nationals have the right to elect a place of residence, while subsidiary-protection 
recipients do not, is a form of discrimination, further complicating an already 
problematic distinction between  ‘ mobile nationals and immobile aliens ’ in EU 
law. 110 A fi rm judicial stance in favour of equal treatment should have led the 
court to allow these legal aliens to choose where to live. 111 On the other hand, 
Germany was seeking a margin of fl exibility in designing its immigration policy 
through a geographic restriction limited in time for those immigrants receiv-
ing public benefi ts. Foremost in the judges ’ minds were likely the media ’ s images 
of Molenbeek, the neighbourhood where several of the terrorists behind recent 
attacks in Paris and Brussels were living, or the deeply disturbing news of riots 
between xenophobic locals and third-country nationals in many different EU 
 cities. Allowing Member States to direct some of their immigrants to particular 
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parts of the territory might in some cases foster the goal of cultural, social and 
 economic integration as well as redistribute the fi scal burden evenly among 
German L ä nder. 112 In the enormous body of literature comparing the available 
range of integration tools, Germany could certainly fi nd support for the idea that 
all urban areas should remain diverse and should host carefully balanced mix-
tures of people of different backgrounds, especially given the state ’ s allocation 
of resources for such purposes. 113 The CJEU eventually decided to grant heavier 
weight to the latter considerations. The holding did narrow down the scope of 
Germany ’ s policy choices, excluding that a Member State could mandate specifi c 
destinations for subsidiary protection benefi ciaries on the sole basis of budgetary 
concerns. At the same time, the Court held that the state should retain the power 
to choose the migrants ’ place of residence if this proved necessary to the goals of 
integration and public safety — a result perhaps perceived as necessary at the time 
to quell  anti-immigrant sentiment at the heart of Europe. 
 Cases like  Viking ,  Laval , and  Alo and Osso prove two points dear to CLS scholars. 
First, the distributive outcomes of adjudication are sometimes easy to identify as 
either progressive or regressive, but just as often they are really complicated, and 
may lead to disagreement even among scholars of equally progressive persuasion. 
The consequences of a judicial decision might remain under-determined, 114 or 
even prove wholly ambivalent, due to rapidly changing historical circumstances 
(and the European Union is certainly experiencing a time of turbulence). 115 
Taking a stance may be diffi cult, and only partly possible. Utopian arguments put 
forth by legal academia may remain, indeed, utopian, and should be acknowl-
edged as such. In some contexts, uncovering blind spots in the court ’ s reasoning 
will be all that a scholar can do. As observed above, however, only an honest com-
mentary informed by all relevant distributive possibilities can point in the direc-
tion of real progress. 
 Second, it is often the case that the law upon which judges must base their 
decision — be it black-letter law, a string of precedents, or relevant  acquis — often 
 ‘ runs out ’ , and CLS ’ s insight on the indeterminacy of legal rules should therefore 
be taken seriously. 116 At the end of the day, many judicial decisions are based on 
one or another vision of the common good, and involve choices between often 
 112  See  Alo and Osso (n 109) para 12 explaining that Germany was attempting: a) to equalise the 
fi scal burdens of the different L ä nder receiving the refugees; b) to  ‘ [avert the] emergence of points of 
social tensions ’ ; and c) to  ‘ [link] foreign nationals in particular need of integration to a specifi c place of 
residence so that they can avail themselves of the integration facilities available there ’ . 
 113  Integration policies in the EU may even draw inspiration from crucial conversations on racial 
justice in the US. See eg  Fisher v University of Texas at Austin  133 S Ct 2198 ( 2016 ) . 
 114  See  Oliver  Wendell Holmes ,  ‘ Privilege, Malice and Intent ’ ( 1894 )  8  Harvard Law Review  1 . 
 115  See Pierre Schlag (n 56) (addressing the plurality of context). 
 116  See  Mark  Kelman ,  A Guide to Critical Legal Studies ( Cambridge ,  Harvard University Press ,  1987 ) 
(outlining the controversy on law ’ s indeterminacy within the CLS movement). cf Peri š in (n 111), 
 suggesting a more univocal account of the effects of decisions like  Alo and Osso . 
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irreconcilable world views. Even though judges cast their reasoning in terms of 
legal necessity, 117 no univocal conclusion can be reached in such disputes sim-
ply on the basis of legal rules and principles (free movement, non-discrimina-
tion, individual rights, international obligations, etc), which remain ultimately 
open-ended. This realisation can be painful, 118 not only for judges duly preoc-
cupied with maintaining an aura of sheer objectivity, but also for progressive 
advocates, who would rather present their own argument as being clearly supe-
rior in point of law. 119 The realisation of law ’ s indeterminacy, however, is often a 
necessary starting point for serious distributive analysis in scholarly circles. 
 Progressive scholars are best positioned to voice the inner limits of legal argumen-
tation, to aid the Court in identifying gaps, confl icts and ambiguities in the law, 
and hopefully to promote distributive justice and inclusion as paramount goals 
of the EU legal system. Only by acknowledging  ‘ the inevitability of value-laden 
choice in adjudication ’ 120 will legal scholars engage the Court in a continuous dia-
logue about values and perhaps, by so doing, move forward the ball of substantive 
justice. 
 117  Karl Klare,  ‘ Critical Perspectives on Social and Economic Rights: Democracy and Separation of 
Powers ’ in Alviar Garc í a, Klare and Williams (eds) (n 63) 3 (noting that  ‘ the decision-maker ’ s judgment 
is a performance enacted to persuade the public that the outcome was required by legal necessity ’ ). 
 118  ibid. ( ‘ Acknowledging that ethical and political choice play a role in adjudication is problematic 
in legal cultures that socialize participants to believe that such infl uence is illegitimate. ’ ) .
 119  ibid. 
 120  ibid. 
